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"Security is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor do the children of 
; men as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than outright 



















Nowadays, people spend a lot of time on web activities like emailing, banking, gaming 
and participating in social networks with their lightweight web browsers. To facilitate the 
ever growing users demands, HTML5 and Adobe Flash are both evolved to offer a new 
paradigm of users experience and programming possibilities. While desktop applications 
are being ported to be web-based, more attacking surfaces are however introduced. Being 
regarded of equal importance as the buffer overflow attacks, cross site scripting (XSS) 
is a common attack that can compromise the integrity of a website. Despite the effort 
of releasing new patches and updates, the fundamental problems of web security still 
remain unresolved.-
This thesis primarily studies the state of the art web attacks and defences as well as 
compares some existing proposals and deployed solutions. In addition to demonstrating 
some proof-of-concept XSS attacks, we reveal statistics on the usage of crossdomain.xml 
file by the top hundreds of thousand popular websites. We propose Trusted Notification 
System (TNS) to alert users for both legitimate and unintended actions taken in a 
particular website. It is believed that TNS can significantly minimize potential damages 
caused by web attacks in which the users can take corresponding remedies. TNS is a 
generic approach towards session-based web attacks, whereas traditional defences focus 
on mitigating against some specific attacks. 
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The web was invented by British scientist Tim Berners-Lee in 1989^ The original idea 
of the World Wide Web is to solve the problem of losing information at CERN^ by 
introducing the hyperlink schema. Under this schema, documents can be easily linked 
together with unique format that can facilitate information sharing among those interest 
groups. 
The born of JavaScript in 1995^ introduced dynamic updates to the web environment. 
User can experience not only fancy user interface, but also dynamic interaction to the 
web server. With Ajax technology, information can be retrieved form different server. 
It also helps partial update of a web page rather than refresh the entire page for each 
request. This feature greatly facilitate the modern use of Internet, as a result most 
application can be built "on the web". 
The evolution from static data presentation era to dynamic shared computing era made 
modern web application extraordinary hard to maintain secure and robust contents 
delivery. From news, messaging, forum, financing, entertainment to web OS, our daily 
involvement in computing heavily depends on web. The main difficulties to maintain 
a secure web application is that, it requires multiple parties to voluntarily cooperate, 
which involved browser, extension, client OS, web server, server OS, nodes or proxies 
between client to browser and the communication protocol. If there exist one single hole 
^The original proposal of the W W W 
^European Organization for Nuclear Research 
^Netscape and Sun announce JavaScript 
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among those entities, unpredictable damages can be caused to tease down the whole 
chain among those parties. 
In this thesis, we will focus to discuss the latest development of attacks and defenses on 
modern web browsers. As the current defenses methodology unable to provide a generic 
solution to mitigate those innovative and rapid changing attacks, we introduce a trusted 
notification scheme (TNS) aim to notify user what had they really done during their 
browsing. We found that TNS is much more robust and trust-worthy than most modern 
traditional web defenses. 
1.1 Web 2.0 
One of the biggest features of Web2.0 is the dynamic browsing experience. Different 
from static text document, Web2.0 heavily depends on JavaScript and Flash plug-in to 
provide rich browsing experience. For instance, Facebook user can view live feed and 
chat with online user. Unlike traditional web architecture, most contents are actually 
created and provided by users in Facebook. Samy worm'^ in 2005 shown how the user 
provided contents can cause significant lost to a company. 
To facilitate the dynamic content retrieval, web developer often use a Javascript API, 
XMLHttpRequest (XHR) to .communicate with its own server. On the other side, any 
XHR request to cross domain server will be blocked by Same Origin Policy (SOP). 
However modern application heavily depends on aggregating resources from more than 
one site cooperatively, there are still some exceptions to bypass the SOP. E.g. Previous .. 
version of flash player allow user to send POST request to third parties without user 
interaction. Indeed, attacker can make use of this "advancement" to exploit the server. • 
1.2 Research Motivation 
As modern web attacks come out day-by-day, current defenses and mitigations are either 
lag behind the attacks or can only be able to solve a specific problem. Problems exist 
not only in a single XHR API," but the whole design of web architecture. Moreover bugs 
and vulnerabilities may also be found in the browser client, where web developers have 
'^ http: //namb. la/popular/tech. html 
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no responsibility to fix it. We would like to introduce TNS that aimed stop most recent 
and future web attacks. Under our notification schema, any status changes issued from 
user will be recorded and report back to the user instantly. In other words, all malicious 
actions created by the attacker will be notified back to user periodically. 
As long as the attacker unable to upload or change the server side's executable files, all 
current session based web attacks such as CSRF, ClickJacking, Phishing and even stolen 
password can be caught on the client side under our notification system. The design of 
TNS is simple and secure enough to eliminate the possibility of creating further loop 
hole for attackers. 
Chapter 2 
Background Study on Web 
Attacks 
Web attacks can be classified into client side attacks and server side attacks, this thesis 
will focus on the client based threats. We classify client side attacks by malicious code 
distribution methods in following three ways: 
• Malicious contents hosted on legitimate server 
• Malicious contents hosted on malicious server 
• Bad guy gain access to intranet and spread malicious contents •. 
Regardless of how they infect the malicious code, damages cost to victim may vary a . 
lot included lose of account, give out current session, information leaks to third party, 
change of account setting, change of browser setting, execute dangerous code locally, 
launch DDOS attacks or further exploit internal networks. 
In following paragraphs, we will discuss about how a web attack can be launched in 
different areas include Cross site scripting, Cross site request forgery, ClickJacking, ex-
tension / plugins vulnerabilities, privacy attacks, traditional netwavk attacks and some 
common implementation flaws. 
4 
Chapter 2. Background Study on Web Attacks 5 
2.1 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 
Cross Site Scripting is an attack that enable attackers to inject web contents on client-
side (mainly JavaScript) and run native scripts on it. As the HTML documents do not 
specify proper regions of DOM documents and program scripts, scripts and HTML tags 
can be mixed within the HTML document. Serious attacks can be launched on client 
side with XSS, such as stealing credentials, cookies session to DDOS attacks on third 
parties. According to XSSed^ at 2010, there are over 36720 total XSS recorded with 
only 2193 are fixed and 6645 onhold, those vulnerable sites included Google, Yahoo, 
MSN and facebook. Even if the programmer aware of this kind of attack and build the 
website with secure mindset, to build a perfect XSS invulnerable page is still an unsolved 
problem. 
Types of XSS 
Cross Site Scripting attacks can be classified into two types, non-persistent XSS and 
persistent XSS. Some research further define non-persistent XSS into Local and non-
Local XSS. 
Non-persistent or reflected X S S exist when attacker be able to inject and execute 
scripts into a webpage through URL request parameter or form. Those scripts are not 
able to store permanently into web server. Once the webpage is closed, the scripts will 
not persist and will not be executed when you revisit the page. If the victim webpage is 
located under user's local drive, IE will execute those source codes in "local zone". This 
kind of attack can result in remote execution vulnerability under browser's privilege and 
bypassing the default client-side sandbox. 
Persistent XSS exist when attacker be able to inject scripts and stored into the web 
server. If visitor revisit the infected page, malicious scripts will be executed in the 
client's browser. These vulnerabilities are more significant than non-persistent one since 
attacker only needed to inject scripts once on the legitimate page. Moreover, attacker 
don't need social engineering technique to spread the infected page, since those code will 
be run automatically when victim visiting the legitimate page. Piippetnets [1] introduce 
distributed attacks on both client and server computer through web browser by XSS, it 
^ http://www.xssed.com/articleslist 
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mentioned hierarchical attack directions from client to server machines which can only 
exist with persistent XSS vulnerability. 
We had conduct a XSS attack on the open source email system, Horde and found out 
various XSS vulnerability that can enable attacker insert malicious scripts on login page 
for stealing victim's credentials. Details are discussed in Appendix A. 
2.2 Cross Channel Scripting (XCS) 
Cross Channel Scripting is a security pitfall when some third party represent information 
from different channel without proper filtering. These attacks are introduced and inves-
tigated by Hristo et. al. [2] in 2009. They found out that several home use electronics 
such as NAS, digital photos frame and web portal are vulnerable to the attack. When 
the attacker manually crafts a photo with specific filename (with script injected), the 
appliance will fail to filter out the script and it will be executed on the client browser 
or even on the server. Example of attacks includes arbitrary file upload, remote file 
inclusion, OS command injection and code injection. 
RXCS can be found on web applications that do mashup and use the contents provided 
by other site. They demonstrate an attack when posting malicious comments on twitter; 
a third party site without filtering will then read and execute the script. There exist 
defense such as Content security policy (CSP) that proposed by Mozilla Foundation, and 
SiteFirewall to defense against XCS attack. CSP uses the HTML header X-Content-
Security-Policy and restrict the use of inline scripts and prevent content loading external .. 
resources. SiteFirewall try to distinguish and block the external data being run on the 
server or client browser. • 
2.3 Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF/Sea Surf) can date back to 2001's message from 
Peter W. By make use of implementation flaw of HTML session management, at-
tacker can craft malicious HTTP request to legitimate server with user's current session. 
For example, <img src="http: / /bank. com/transfer.php?to=badguy/value=9999/> 
2http://www.tux.org/~peterw/csrf.txt 
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hosted on attacker.com can steal money from victim's account if he had login to the 
bank before with session remained in the same browser. 
Login CSRF is an alternate attack that attacker forge a login request in victim browser 
before victim visit that particular site. Private information such as activity history, item 
bought or even credit card information will be stored in attacker's account with Login 
CSRF. For example, victim first visits attacker site A. It contained a login request on 
site B with attacker's account, then the victim visit site B with attacker session and 
buy a product through VISA. Then the credit information and browsing history will be 
saved on attacker's account if site B provide a way for its legitimate user to do so. 
^ 二 c 丨 ‘ w 蹿 二 麵 耗 
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FIGURE 2 . 1 : Attacker lure user to "Click Here!" to continue 
2.4 ClickJacking 
Jermiah Grossman and Robert Hansen discovered an exploitation on Flash browser 
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of clicks. The attacker's page iframed an invisible page (Flash camera setting) and 
overlay on attacker's own content. As long as user follow attacker's instruction and do 
several clicks, configuration on the Flash settings will also be changed by those clicks 
without user intension. ClickJacking attack is not limited to Flash plugins but also to 
all "unprotected" pages. The clicks on attacker's content will actually click through the 
legitimate iframed page and launch GET / POST request to legitimate server. With 
consequence clicks you can send a email, change social network account's setting, delete 
an online account or even buy a product from online shopping sites. (Figure 2.1) shown 
- a page viewed by victim where attacker persuade him to click on "Click here!" button, 
however victim will take attacker's item into shopping cart with a click (Figure 2.2). 
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F I G U R E 2.2: "Buy it!"" link is covered under "Click Here!" 
2.5 Extension and plugins vulnerabilities 
Even if developer already secured their own codes on their web applications, clients may 
still under attack if server side permit user to upload swf files to their server. Dated ‘ 
back to 2008 pwn2own contest, Windows Vista - a platform which claimed to be the 
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most secure OS had been defeated by a vulnerability of third party flash plugins. Such 
similar vulnerability exist from time to time 4. 
Other than Adobe Flash Player, most famous browser plugins included Java Applet, 
Gears APIs, Microsoft Active X and SilverLight can be dangerous executed up to 
Browser privileges regardless of the secure sandbox system. Java Applet implemented 
policy based scheme that signed Java Applet can do whatever it wants up to user priv-
ilege once the user click yes to proceed. The Evil Java Applet program can obtain a 
certificate or self-signed certificate and tricks user to accept, if the user accepted to run 
the signed applet, programs can even upload local drive without further notice to user. 
Comparatively, SilverLight have higher restriction than Java Applet, it will require "Open-
FileDialog"“ natively for file upload (the native upload dialog box of OS). However it 
doesn't means that using SilverLight will be more secure than Java Applet, installing 
more plugins will just open more backdoors to your attacker. Microsoft released critical 
update on October, 2009^ which stated Microsoft .NET runtime can allow remote code 
execution. If user views a specially crafted web page using web browser with SilverLight, 
the victim's machine can be taken over by the attacker. 
Firefox Extensions security model relied on Mozilla's authority check and community 
review. A plugin can be search and published at Mozilla legitimate page only if it is 
approved to be safe by its authority. However attacker can still host their plugin in their 
blog and tricks users to install. As the plugins can actually craft third party executable 
files to run, upload predictable local resource is a trivial action to mention. Adam Barth 
et al. [3] listed out four classes of attack that can be launched with an evil extension. 
Attacker can gain full control of your browser and bypass all security checks with evil 
extension installed. Attacker can also inject scripts, replace native firefox and JavaScript 
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2.6 Privacy Issue 
Due to the increase usage of personal access on Internet in recent years, privacy issue 
had become an important topic. From your browsing history, search history, average 
browsing time, clicking habits to personal information there exists ways for identity theft 
to steal. 
Unfortunately, not only cyber-criminals may have interest to your personal informa-
tions, companies like Google, facebook, Amazon and etc may also have interest to your 
preference as to maximize their profit. It is not a new story for them to cooperate up 
and sell your information^\ these unethical trade will not be discussed in this thesis. 
Timing attacks, Felten et al. introduced timing attack[4] in 2000. This attack probe 
a target web server and check the round trip time to learn user's web browsing history. 
The same technique can also be used to probe DNS cache and learn which IP address had 
recent access. The attack accuracy increased if the remote machine is located further 
away. 
Side channel attacks can expose user browsing information on the air. [5] Attacker 
can guess victim's browsing content through sniffing in a HTTPS protected channel 
by taking advantages on stream cipher packet encryption on RC4 with observing the 
HTTPS request and response's packet size. They studied four kinds of common used 
web application and found out privacy leakage. Prom the size of packet responded from 
autosuggestion with limited result, attacker guess out what the victim is searching in 
high accuracy. From the sequential packet size change of request and response pair, 
attacker can know which page the victim is browsing. Prom the size of image responded 
from server, attacker can know which page victim is monitoring. This kind of attacks -
can cause unpredictable disaster with tailor made analyze tools applied on target sites 
in government and banking field. 
Browser History, history of visited links are stored in client browser to facilitate 
browsing experience (For example, darken visited link by default), cache is stored at 
the client side for faster browsing experience. However recent use of web application 
start to overwhelm those handy features by checking whether user browsing behavior is 
suitable for relevant advertisement cooperatively. Henrik Gemal rediscover using CSS' 
®http: "www.readwriteweb.com/archives/facebook_sells_your一data.php 
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FIGURE 2 . 3 : Visited links highlighted by CSS 
can reveal which page had you visited (Figure 2.3). Later on 2006, Jeremiah Grossman 
succesfully used Javascript alone? or CSS alone^ to achieve the same result. With the 
same technique, attacker can even brute force any secret tokens or parameters sent 
through GET method in the client browser. However both HTML5 and CSS3 working 
group seems regard those problem as a minor one and unwilling to proceed any fix on 
it. 
Flash player can check basic information on client's computer'^ by using Action Script 3 
such as: OS version, Flash player version, support for audio, video streaming and more. 
Malicious SWF files can check the client side's flash version and sent those information 
to attacker site for further analysis. For example, attacker can host flash advertisement 
and collect data from all of the clients and try to penetrate those with old OS version 
and old flash version with higher chance to succeed. 
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2.7 Network security 
DNS rebinding is a DNS based attack introduced by Jackson et al. [6] to subvert the 
same origin policy in default web browser. Attacker registers a domain and delegates it 
to his own DNS server and set a very short Time to live (TTL) record. When victim 
visit the malicious page, the same URI attacker.com will be redirected to different IP 
address such that the SOP can be break in this way. 
Port scanning is an old security issue, however it comes to a concern in web environ-
ment. With Javascript, attacker can make a port scanning to victim's internal network 
by checking the response time on different ports of victim's internal server. Although 
most modern browser had blocked connection made to well known ports (Under 1024), ‘ 
this Javascript scanning technique can still works on the most common used browser in 
2009 - IE 6:10. Recent Flash Player upgraded its security standard. With Flash 10, it 
throws securityError if the swf file connecting to port lower than 1024 or if the target 
site doesn't provide proper crossdomain.xml file. 
Drive-by-pharming is an attack to home use router by CSRF attacks. Due to easy 
configuration and to cut down production cost, almost all home use router in the same 
model have same default login user name and password of the web interface. Phenoelit^^ 
had published a password list for over 1000 common routers on the markets. The more 
dangerous issue is that, most routers failed to provide a secure web interface. An URL 
with HTTP GET request can be sufficient to change the IP address of the default DNS • 
of the router. Combining with CSRF attacks, an attacker can host a iimg么 tag and 
made a GET request to change the DNS of victim's machine and pointing all URL to ••. 
attacker's server. After the change of DNS, attacker will be able to get all information 
from victim's browser and they can provide malicious contents to the victim too. For 
example, if the victim remains the router session and browser a website with image tag 
as: <img src=http : "192.168.0 .1 /conf ig?myDNS=l .2 ‘3 .4> his router's DNS will be 
changed to 1.2.3.4 without any notification to the user. 
Wi-Fi attacks such as sidejacking and airpwn are well known attacks on weak wireless 
networks (Open network and WEP encrypted networks). Sidejacking is a term intro-
duced in BlackHat conference at 2007, they used a tool called "Hamster and Ferret" to 
^°http://marketshare.hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=0 
"http://www.phenoelit-us.org/dpl/dpl.html 
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obtain cookies from the open network to gather cookies from victim's browser. One can 
also use sniffing tools like Wireshark to obtain the same result if the attacker gained 
access to same network of the victim. Airpwn is another wifi attack tools which aimed 
inject packets to client machine and deface the victim's browser by sending response 
packet faster than the browser. 
In Hong Kong, however is not well addressed this issue. In a statistic from safewifi^^, 
they sampled 58,224 Access point in Hong Kong. Over 59% AP are either unencrypted 
or WEP encrypted. Using WPA/WPA2 networks are neither save that they are still 
vulnerable to brute force attacks and side channel attacks which we mentioned in the 
privacy issue before. 
2.8 Developer implementation flaw 
According to OWASP Top 10-2010 "The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security 
Risks" 13，security misconfiguration is considered as top 6 vulnerability. It stated out 
developers are usually not able to deliver secure code in practice which cost invaluable 
financial lost of their company. 
Moreover, developer can easily trapped by rapid development; they may follow default 
paths, unused pages, unprotected files and etc during installation of open source web 
application. Its dangerous as testing pages and admin username is guessable and easily-
obtainable by attacker. For example, Word Press have default admin page located at 
/wordpress/admin.php; Horde have its testing page showing current server environment. 
Many developer show ignorance to keep default files, let them publish and reachable by 
search engines. On the other hand, unable to provide HTML form validation or unaware 
of defining proper policy rules of Cross-Domain-Policy file in Flash 10 will consequence 
web attacks, too. Following we pointed out some unclear or misleading documentations 
on modern web development which made developers easily fall into traps. 
Cross domain request (XDR) is introduced by IE8. It facilitate cross site commu-
nication. XDR call will deny all request from Internet t o Intranet as to protect the 
^^http://www.safewifi.hk 
i3http：//www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Proj ect 
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F I G U R E 2.4: A request from internet to intranet ‘ 
internal networks from attacks from malicious sites according to Microsoft's documen-
tation^'^. However we found out that a request from Internet to Intranet is actually-
allowed which violated what they claimed. Figure 2.4 showed a request issued from 
personal . ie .cuhk.edu.hk to an internal network 192.168.74.56，both GET or POST 
methods are allowed. Although IE8 forbid cookies being attached to third party site, 
communications from Internet to intranet or vise versa is still vulnerable if the third 
parties attach sessions through the (GET/POST) request parameter. Attacks such as 
drive-by-pharming can still are launched on IE8 browser. 
Request issued from Intranet t o Internet is allowed by default, potential risk exist of . 
leaking internal network's resource to public. For example, an attacker send an email to 
victim with XDR request (Assumed the web application have XSS vulnerabilities), may •• 
leak internal information to attacker through XDR connections to malicious server. 
Access control allow origin, header is specified in the third-party site to tell which 
sites(origins) they want to communicate with. However different browser have different 
behavior. Firefox 3.6，Chrome 6 and Safari 5 stick to W3C working draft for HTML5 im-
plementation whereas IE8 have its own design. Such a difference will introduce problems 
on compatibility and supports on different web sites. Supplying the Accesss-Control-
Allow-Origin header is not enough to protect the resources, developer should further 
check whether the request origin is valid or not: 
i4http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd573303(VS.85).aspx 
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Bad implementation: 
<?php 









No matter the Access-Control-Allow-Origin is restricted or not specified, the request 
will actually sent out from XDR each time the function is called. In other words, a DOS 
attacks can be launched for consuming CPU process on the third party site through 
XDR request. 
3rd-party cookies. On IE6 or IE7, XMLHttpRequest is supported but it won't be 
able to send the request across different origin. Moreover, 3rd-party cookies will not be 
attached by default if the p3p privacy policy header did not manually specified. However 
the HTML5 standards on modern browser tends to facilitate mashup and cross site 
communication. The header "Access-Control-Allow-Credeitnals" is created if the site 
allow 3rd party cookies. If the developer unable to handle ACAO and ACAC headers 
properly (For example, to allow all origin and 3rd party cookies), cross site attacks can 
be launched on these modern browsers.) 
In Flash 10, the allowance of cross domain communications are based on a crossdo-
main.xml file. We had found out some developer cannot provide a proper restricted 
policy to protect their own site; detail results are listed in Chapter 4. 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we revealed most common web attacks on the client side. Server side 
attacks such as SQL injection or Buffer overflow attacks will not be discuss in this thesis. 
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XSS attacks are well known as the next generation of Buffer overflow attack. The entry-
level of XSS attacks is low, however it open the door to introduce more attacks once a 
site exist XSS vulnerability. 
XSS and XCS are vulnerabilities exist on owner's site, which can be fixed by developer 
on filtering client-supplied text. Besides, vulnerabilities can exist on the design flow of 
application or even the browser itself. Attacks such as CSRF, privacy attacks, Click 
Jacking and network attacks can be categorize to the design flaw of web application. 
Which cannot be fixed by adding filtering directly, mitigation of such attacks can only 
be done specifically on different web. In the next chapter, we will discuss the current 
state of art of web defenses on different categories. 
Chapter 3 
Defenses on Web Attacks 
In this chapter, we will discuss the security framework on current web browser. Included 
same origin policy, current browser defenses on IE8, Firefox and Google Chrome and 
defenses introduced by recent academic papers. 
3.1 Same Origin Policy 
Same Origin Policy can dates back to Netscape Navigator 2.0. The origin design is being 
used in all modern web browser to restrict access of web scripting language to its own 
domain. With SOP, web scripting language such as Javascript or ActionScript in Flash 
can only be accessed and manipulated by the resource hosted on" same protocol and 
same host (URL), every attempt on different host or different domain will be blocked 
by default. 
Since the design of HTTP protocol is connectionless, states of client's session or au-
thenticity is depended on HTTP cookies. If the third-party site allowed gaining access 
to other's domain, they can change or steal user's identity and which is unacceptable. 
However, current trends of web applications tend to cooperate more than two different 
hosts to share their own contents and aggregate information to the user. They called 
this "Mashup" • It is primarily violated the concept of SOP restriction, and there are 
ways to by-pass SOP protection in a cooperative way. 
17 
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As SOP is such an important security concept of browser-side programming language, 
developer should take extra attentions to write Mashup applications without compro-
mising its security standard. We will discuss the pros and cons about different ways to 
handle a cross-site communication with HTML5 and FlashlO in modern browsers. 
Extended defenses on SOP. As SOP is limited to protect resource being grab or read 
from different origins, further protection is needed on web2.0 technology. Browser cache, 
offline storage, certificate warnings and visited links should also be take into account due 
to the raising concern of privacy issues of modern browsers. Jackson et al.[7]，Livshits 
and Ulfar [8] and karlof et al. [9] had proposed different ways to further extend current 
SOP protection. 
3.2 Filtering mechanism 
Filtering is the most common and strict forward defense against injection attacks. Since 
the design HTML allows developer to insert scripts and codes into anywhere of a page 
without restriction. The threshold of attack is low to launch XSS attacks through 
submitting HTML form or URL request. Filtering is not a perfect solution against web 
attack, as attacker can find alternative ways to change their attacking vector to by-pass 
such filtering mechanism. We will discuss some common mechanism on filtering on both 
client and server side. 
3.2.1 Client-side filtering 
Although client side filtering is not the ultimate solution, it can filter out most common . 
automated injections. The boundary line to maximize the security of a web application 
is to only provide information to the user and forbid user to change the web resources. 
However it is too harsh for modern web applications, which needed user to construct 
and provide web contents. Filtering on client side can normally be done by blacklisting 
or whitelisting special characters. 
Blacklisting recognize and encode special characters such as '< ' and‘〉，to html entities 
which will not be parsed and processed by HTML engine. However there exist different, 
ways of attack vectors which try to by-pass such blacklist filtering system. It is not 
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difficult to find a cheat sheet i for XSS to by pass normal filter from the internet. In 
the cheat sheet they have different ways to by-pass the injection, for example advanced 
attacker will avoid to u s e � s c r i p t � a s their attack vector, instead they use non-standard 
UTF-8 encodings and more. 
Whitelisting is to only allow a particular set of characters to be input from user. 
For example, a blog can only allow user to type alphabetic, numbers and space to its 
entry. The tradeoff is that it usually cannot satisfy user's requirement. For example, a 
non-English blogger can only chose to user other web product. 
However there does not exist a perfect filtering system for filtering all kind of web attacks. 
During our study, we found out a facebook application's flaw that can allow attacker to 
insert random images and links to that. Details are described in Appendix B. 
Filtering design is differed on various client browser. Filters such as noXSS and no-
script filter on firefox, XSS filter on IE8 analyze HTTP response before it processed 
by the browser. Daniel Bates et. al. [10] pointed out that it is a design flaw in such a 
filtering mechanism, as unacceptable slow and can easily be circumvented. They propose 
a mechanism to examine the response after parsing phase by the browser. Such a post-
filtering mechanism named "XSSAiiditor" is adopted in Chrome browser and claimed to 
have high-performance and lower false negative rate. Web developer can enable the full 
page blocking by sending "X-XSS-Protection:l; mode=block" header response to client 
browser. Browser will then display a blank page if XSS is detected on the current site. 
3.2.2 Server-side filtering 
Ingress and Egress filtering are two ways to do encoding on server side. There is plenty 
of APIs to use in server side language, such as HTMLEntities, htmlspecialchars of PHP, 
HtmlEncode for ASP. Such functions can convert special characters into HTML enti-
ties, which will just display as an output like alphabet characters instead of processed by 
HTML parser. With such filtering technique is not able to bullet proof the web applica-
tion. Firstly, the API may exist vulnerability itself. Buffer overflows attack are found ^ 
in htmlentities and htmlspecialchars in older version of PHP (4.0 - 5.1). Secondly, after 
egress filtered result may further processed by third-party website. XCS may exist if 
ifattp: " h a . ckers. org/xss. html 
^http://secunia.com/advisories/22653/ 
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the third party failed to handle the information properly which we had mentioned in 
previous chapter. 
Taint-tracking is a technique to centralize sanitization checks at the output interface 
by using taint metadata. It assumed server side processing is consistent with client side 
rendering, if the server side is inconsistent from the client side parsing, vulnerability 
may still exist. Works such as XSS-Guard[ll], Efficient fine-grained binary instrumen-
tation with application to taint-tracking [12] and Dynamic multiprocess information flow 
tracking[13] are related studies on taint-tracking techniques on server side. 
3.3 XSS Defenses 
XSS protection is built in IE8 mitigate reflective XSS attacks from URL injection by-
recognizing whether will scripts appeared on URL will be reflected in the browser con-
tents. This defense had been found vulnerable^ in last year. No significant fix are 
provided. The bug in XSS-protection can enable serious security attacks against web-
sites that are otherwise safe. Google suggest developer disable this feature by supplying 
"X-XSS-Protection:0" as response header. 
HttpOnly is a defense on access of cookies introduced by IE since 2002. If the cookie's 
HttpOnly attribute set to true, cookie will not be able to read/write by Javascript. 
HttpOnly can prevent XSS attacks that tried to read and transfer cookies to attacker 
site. 
Jail tag is another defense on XSS which disallow supplied contents inside <jail> tag . 
to be execute and parse by browser. However this jail tag will also break legitimate 
contents to execute Javascript. For Example, Google gadgets needed Javascript to offer 
interactive experience to user under protected environment, which will no longer function 
properly with jail tag. 
Defense on user upload files. MiME sniffing is a handy feature on browser that 
can offload developer jobs by guessing user submitted content type with sniffing the 
file's header. For example, user submits an image file with filename icon.img, client 
browser will try to guess and display such image with proper image format by reading 
3http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/ll/20/internet_explorer_security_flaw/ 
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the icon.img's content. However malicious user who submits bad contents to fake the 
sniffer can exploits this feature. IE7 is vulnerable to attacks with manually crafted 
upload image. IE8 is still vulnerable to sites, which accept non-image uploads from 
untrusted users. Barth et. al. [14] suggested a different content-sniffing algorithm. It is 
deployed in Google Chrome and standardized by HTML 5. 
Common defense against client upload objects included transforming the content from 
different type and stored on server. For example, Flickr converts imaged uploaded 
by user to JPEG format. Hosting content off-domain, which can distinguish the web 
content and user submitted content into two different origins. It protected the web 
contents by SOP. For example, Yahoo use yimg.com to host its image, Wikipedia use 
upload.wikipedia.org. Developers can also disable the content sniffing feature by includ-
ing X-Content-Type-Options:nosnifF to turn down IE8，s sniffing function. Developer can 
also adding "Content-Disposition:attachment", and "X-Download-Options:NoOpen" to 
force browser to download the content as an attachment. 
DOM-based defenses 
As most injection based attack will finally placed inside DOM elements and accessing 
different objects under DOM tree, protection against malicious scripts to manipulate 
DOM elements is another way to stop threats other than filtering system. 
In order to distinguish user supplied resources (potential danger exists) and server re-
sources, researches suggest to identify them by server supply Escudo[15] is a protection 
model introduced by Karthick Jayaraman et. al. A specific tag id is created by server 
and associated with div elements inside the same dom. Assumed the site have XSS 
vulnerability, attacker can still unable to guess nor obtain the tag id from scripts under 
the restriction of protection. Without the legal tag id, injected scripts will not be parsed 
nor executed by client HTML engine. Noncespace[16] (using randomization to enforce 
information flow tracking and thwart cross-site scripting attack) uses randomized XML 
namespace prefixes to identify and annotate untrusted content. The advantage compare 
to Escudo is that, server need not sanitize untrusted content. Processing time on the 
server side is comparatively lower. 
D O M access checker is an software written by M. Zalewski and F. Almeida"^.It is 
a tool designed to automatically validate numerous aspects of domain security policy 
'^http://Icamtuf. core dump. cx/doin_checker/ 
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enforcement (cross-domain DOM access, cookies, XHR calls, event handling) to detect 
common security attack. Numerous scanners exist to perform similar works, which will 
not be discussed in following sections. 
B E E P to defeating script injection attacks with browser-enforced embedded policies[17] 
Browser-Enforced Embeded Policies is a simple mechanism for preventing script injec-
tion. The idea is that a web site can embed a policy in its pages that specifies which 
scripts are allowed to run. They used two methods to distinguish valid script. First 
method, whitelists legitimate script by associate the known script to SHA-1 hash. Sec-
ond method, sandbox untrusted user-supply resource to "noexecutie" DIV. 
Content Security Policy ® further enhance BEEP and is built into Firefox 4. The 
main goal of CSP is to prevent malicious code from being injected into a website and 
executed within the context of the site. The restrictions are as follow: 
• No inline script will be executed except script in files loaded from white-listed. 
Code will not be created from strings. For example, no eval(), no Javascript:code() 
• No data: URIs unless opted-in to via explicit policy 
• XBL bindings must come from Chrome: or resource: URIs 
Developer needed to provide the CSP file to harden their own website. If policy header 
"X-Content-Security-Policy “ do not exist, inline script can still be injected by attacker. ’ 
On the other hand, if Crossdomain policy file does not provided by the site, flash cannot 
send cross-site request by default. • 
3.4 CSRF Defenses 
Memeto[18] is a framework to detect CSRF attacks. Since each request is associated 
from / to a particular page. Any requests issued from browser actually bring to web 
application to different page (state). By detecting the possible changing state from the 
browser, CSRF can be spotted. For example, if the client had login to bank A and 
suffered from CSRF attack from third party and issued a money transfer request to. 
°http://people.mozilla.org/~bsterne/content-security-policy/details.html 
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bank A. However if this client did not visit the bank's transfer page, he is not possible 
to issue money transfer request in normal situation, CSRF attack can be detected by 
Memeto. They can also detect XSS attacks base on Javascript similarity checks with 
server's code and user-supplied code. Memento's notion of Javascript similarity requires 
an exact match of chosen structural heuristics and high text similarity. So, an attacker 
can succeed in injecting a Javascript program only if the injected code has high similarity 
with genuine one. 
By checking Referrer header first proposed by [19] and using Origin header [20] are 
also a simply way to mitigate CSRF attacks. However, if the browser doesn't provide 
the referrer header for privacy issue and did not supply an origin header in older browser 
version, legitimate applications may not work properly. Some approach introduce al-
ternate method to add secret token on GET/POST parameters [21] [22] to distinguish 
legitimate requests. 
SessionSafe[23] in 2006 classified and examined web attack into three classes includes: 
The availability of session tokens via Javascript, the pre-knowledge of the application's 
URLs and the implicit trust relationship between pages of same domain. The paper pro-
posed three methods on hardening web against XSS, and session riding (a.k.a. CSRF). 
The three defenses are Deferred Loading Process to prevent the unauthorized trans-
mission of SID information, Subdomain Switching to limit the impact of XSS vulner-
abilities to only exist on the vulnerable pages and One-Time U R L s to prevent browser 
hijacking attacks. 
3.5 Browser warnings 
Whenever user performing dangerous actions, browser is responsible give out sufficient 
warning to user for not proceeding. Which include executing a file downloaded from 
untrusted sites, accessing website with certificate error either on self-sign cert or expired 
certs, redirect from a HTTPS site to HTTP site, visiting phishing site which had been 
blacklisted by browser or running third-party plugins such as Java Applet / . Active X 
which may require your browser privilege to proceed. 
Recently, Firefox3.5 and IE8 tried to increase the barrier of attacks by annoying user 
with scary warnings and require more clicks to continue browsing when invalid certificate 
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is detected. However Google Chrome drive in an opposite direction, a click on "proceed 
anyway" can allow user to view untrusted contents. Strategies applied by IE and Firefox 
doesn't works as many legitimate site user obtained self-signed certificate and users are 
trained to by-pass those security warnings. They seldomly view the certificate contents 
thoroughly, instead they perform a serious of robotic user clicks. Firefox plugins: New 
MitM Me® is created for bypassing those certificate error. A secure browser shouldn't 
allow such plugins exist as it solidly violated the secure policy on client browser. 
^^^BSSffl^^HUi H H H H H M I 
SmartSaeen Block Pane j 
丨 丨 SmartSoreen Download Block 
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F I G U R E 3 . 1 : Different warnings from web browser 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we encapsulated some common defenses on modern web attacks on ••. 
both client and server side. Web developers and browser vendors are responsible for 
cooperation on building secure web interface to serve layman user. Secure coding on the 
developer side include extensive filtering technique to stop malicious injections such as 
XSS and secure design of web application to against CSRF and ClickJacking attacks. 
On the browser vendor side, they are responsible to secure their API for developer to 
use, such as XML level 2 and XDR are good examples. They are also responsible for 
education on the client side for not trusting unknown resources on the web, blocks 
malicious site by blacklisting them and more. 
®https://addons.mozilla.org/hu/firefox/addon/79787/ 
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Although both developers and browser vendors had already tried their best to reproduce 
a secure and friendly environment on the web, attacks on web still exist mainly due to 
the laziness of web developer and the incompatibility for the same code on different web 
browsers. Incompatibility on web browser is not only a bug but also a nightmare to web 
developer that leaded to loose codes. In the next chapter, we will show how different 
browser treats cross domain request and a statistic on how modern web site built the 
policy file for cross domain request on flash. 
Chapter 4 
On web communication 
We compare the security models of HTML5 and Flash Player 10 of Web2.0 functions 
against various attacks on modern browsers. 
4.1 On cross domain communication 
4.1.1 HTML5 
XMLHTTPRequest(XHR) is used to issue AJAX request to server since HTML4. 
Former XHR request can only facilitate same site request. For instance, a request 
connected to site B while client visiting site A will be blocked under same origin policy. 
It does not help Mashup application as SOP is aimed to protect the resource from being 
retrieved by different origin. This SOP restriction can be disabled manually in IE8 by • 
checking "Access data sources across domains" in Security settings. Whereas Firefox or • 
Chrome do not provide such options to disable SOP. 
XMLHTTPRequest level 2 ( X H R 2 ) facilitates Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) 
which standardized in HTML5. Browsers such as Firefox3.5 and Safari 4 had by now 
deployed it. XHR's capable to issue cross-site request for mashups application. XHR2 
provided following capabilities, which is not included in XHR: • 
• Send cross domain request, if the third party site cooperatively provide header . 
• Send third party cookies 
26 
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• Preflight request 
When sending cross-domain request by either GET or POST request, client side will 
automatically attach an Origin header to the target server to indicate which site the 
request is originated from. The origin header cannot be faked or manipulated by scripts 
from client side. Flash 10 had an update to forbid user adding or changing this ori-
gin header or referrer header for security purpose. After receiving this header, server 
will then response its content with Access-Control-Allow-Origin (ACAO) header to tell 
whether will they allow the current request. If the ACAO header is not presented or 
current origin is not allowed in ACAO, responses from server will not be accessible by-
client side's script. 
As we stated in Chapter 2, if server are not prepared for HTML5 to filter request other 
than own origin, it is vulnerable for cross origin script to reach such server. Although 
the third party site cannot obtain client's current session or credential under current 
schema, cookies can still be attached and sent through the XHR2 cross-domain request. 
Preflight request is mandatory to send to server before third-party cookies needed to 
POST to server according to HTMLS's CORS standard. This preflight request is sent 
with method named "OPTIONS", purposely asking whether the server will support 
attaching cookies to site with other domain. If the server reply back with "Access-
Control-Allow-Credentials^true" response header, cookies can be attached in the next 
request. 
In our experiments, we found out that Firefox and Safari follow HTMLS's working draft. 
However Google Chrome only partially support XHR level 2. It is doable to skip preflight 
request before third-party cookies is sent. Trace 4.1 and Trace 4.2 shown the behavior 
when POST request with cookies is made to facebook.com with Chrome 6.0 and Firefox 
3.5. For GET request with cookies attached, neither Firefox nor Chrome requires a 
preflight request. 
CrossDomainRequest ( X D R ) is invented and used by Microsoft IE8. It limited 
request method to GET/POST/HEAD. Requests of TRACE/DELETE/PUT in XHR 
are removed as it may lead to cross-site tracing vulnerabilities, or even deleting a doc-
ument on some insecure site. In addition, IE8 removed certain function support from 
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FIGURE 4.2: Preflight request forcefully required before POST with cookies in Firefox . 
XHR2, including setRequestHeader(), getResponseHeader(), and getAllResponseHead-.. 
ers(). Header of XDR request cannot be customized and cookies cannot be attached to 
cross-domain in both GET and POST request. • 
In other words, XDR is much more restrictive by removing several normal usage in 
cross-domain request. 
4.1.2 Flash 10 
Flash ensures authentic cross-origin requests by checking a master policy file (crossdo-
main.xml) before issuing any requests. The master policy file is located under root level" 
tittp://www.example.com/crossdomain.xml，which provides accessibility information 
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of resources for different domains. Each cross domain request (GET/POST) initiated 
from Flash file will first consult this policy by implicitly calling loadPolicyFile(). Then 
an authenticated request is sent if the policy file allows it. 
The usage of crossdomain.xml is similar to XHR2's preflight request, since it is obligatory 
for Flash player to consult master policy file before sending any request to a different 
domain, whereas XHR2s preflight request is mandatory sent to server before attaching 
cookies for POST request to different origin. 
Flash do not implement Origin header and developer cannot manually change Referer 
or Origin header for security reason. Unexpectedly, Flash will attach cookies on every 
request. Like XDR, Flash swf will not send out Referer header to the server to protect 
user's privacy. It drives on opposite direction about mitigation against CSRF as some 
research suggests checking referrer in HTTPS connections. Instead, XHR2 will send out 
Referer header in GET/POST request but not in OPTIONS request. 
Summary of Cross-site request behavior with XDR, XHR2 and Flash plugins: 
XDR Firefox's XHR Chrome's XHR Flash 10 
Attach Referer Header No Yes Yes No 
Attach Origin Header Yes Yes Yes No 
Attach Cookie No Yes Yes Yes 
Preflight Request No Required i No Required 
Cache policy settings^ No Yes Yes No 
4.1.3 Extended studys crossdomain.xml of Flash 
In this subsection, we will discuss more thoroughly on the implementation on crossdo-
main.xml of Flash. We conducted an experiment on analyzing this file on 100000 top 
sites around the world. 
The master policy file is needed to present on site B, if cross domain request allowed to 
send from site A to B. This master policy file specified which domain and port is allowed 
for cross-domain request in XML format. Following attached http: //www. google . com/ 
crossdomain.xml and ht tp : //www .facebook. com/crossdomain. xml files: 
1 Preflight required iff sending a P O S T request with cookies attached 
2 Policy of A C A O setting will be cached once the page have be visited 
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<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<！DOCTYPE cross-domain-policy SYSTEM 
"http://www.macromedia.com/xml/dtds/cross-domain-policy.dtd"> 
<cross-domain-policy> 
<sit;e—control permitted—cross—domain—policies="by-coirteirt—type" /> 
</cross-domain-policy> 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<！DOCTYPE cross-domain-policy SYSTEM 
"http://www.adobe.com/xml/dtds/cross-domain-policy.dtd"> , 
<cross-domain-policy> 
〈site-control permitted-cross-domain-policies="master-oiily" /> 
<allow-access-from domain="s-static.facebook.com" /> 
<allow-access-from domain="static.facebook.com" /> 
</cross-domain-policy> 
Developer can also explicitly specify their own policy file's location (hostname/s/specif i c . 
xml) in addition to the master policy file presented in the top level director of the target ‘ 
domain (hostname/crossdomain.xml). Whereas in Flash 9, request will not be blocked 
even if the default master policy file don't exist. • 
We had investigated to top lOOOOO^  sites crossdomain file(In figure 4.3). 8817 unreach- • 
able sites are ignored. We found out in those accessible sites 18149 (20%) sites with the 
crossdomain.xml file presented. 
There exist 5659(31%) sites allow all other domains to access its content by setting 
Allow-access-from domain to wild-card "*" • It is dangerous as the third-party untrusted 
site could craft a CSRF attacks or reveal user's information from the current browser's 
current token on this vulnerable site. 
^http://www.alexa.com/topsites • 
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FIGURE 4.3: Crossdomain.xml file statistic 
Moreover, some site specified the "security “ field to false. It will allow site from HTTPS 
to communicate to HTTP channels, this scenario is disallowed or prompted by default in 
most modern browser. There are 764 sites exist such problem by setting "secure=false". 
304 sites allow swf files connect to all ports on the web server by setting (to-ports二 “*”). 
It may expose port scanning or DDOS attacks by swf file hosted in third party site. 53 
sites totally open their doors to hackers by setting their crossdomain.xml file with: 
<allow-access-from domain="*" to-ports="*" secure="false"/> 
According to the results, some developer does not understand the true meaning of setting 
secure=false in crossdomain file. In http: //admin. brightcave. com/crossdomain. 
xml, they marked:" Its about SSL content being made less secure somehow" as a com-
ment. Instead, setting secure=false allow swf files loaded from HTTP URLs to access 
HTTPS URLs on the server. 
Moreover, by analyzing the crossdomain file, we can also find out particular ports used 
by server and their internal network's information. For example, oyance-web.fr, www. 
stickam.jp, hak5.org allow connection to port 6667 to their own site. Port 6667 is a 
well-known port used by trojan. Whereas metin.com, ogame.gr provide port 666 for 
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others to access. Gameyes.com allow connections from 218.xxx and 60.xxx which is not 
suppose to be exposed and known by public. 
4.2 On cross frame communication 
Frame communication is an important ingredient in web2.0. In tradition, different frame 
can only use “Fragment identifier" to communicate. However it cannot fulfill the require-
ment of modern web application, which may require response from the target frame. 
PostMessage API is introduced for better frame communication. Adam Barth et al.[24] 
proposed improvements in postMessage API to provide confidentialities. The policy of 
frame communication is refined to only allow resources accessed by same site in HTML5. 
However we found out thats not the case in some special situation in Flash 10. 
We setup a series of test case for function navigateToURL in FlashlOs Actionscript, 
which allow the swf file changing other frame's location. It is ideally under controlled 
by SOP to prevent malicious flash swf to deface the whole website. However we found 
out different behavior on handling such navigation on various browsers. Result are as 
follow. 
The test cases are being conducted on IE 8.0.6001，Firefox 4.0 Beta 1, Opera 10.6, Safari 
5.0 and Google Chrome 5.03..The test page included two iframe with iframeA conducted 
Flash swf file. This Flash swf use naviageToURL to change iframeB's location. Ideally, 
iframeB wont be changed if they are not in the same domain under the protection 
of SOP. We used different combinations to host iframe and the flash file on different .. 
domains and found out that the results are however different than expected. 
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F I G U R E 4.4: Frame navigation by navigateToURL with flash 
Test cases when resources hosted in different domains: 
Test cases hosted under same domain hosted in different domain 
Case 1: iframeA, B and swf 
Case 2: iframeA, B swf 
Case 3: iframeB iframeA and swf 
Case 4: nested iframeA and swf 
Changes to iframeB by iframeA's swf: 
IE Firefox Opera Safari Chrome 
Case 1 Changed New tabs Changed Changed Changed 
Case 2 Changed Changed Changed Changed Changed 
Case 3 Pop-up New tabs New tabs Pop-up New tabs 
Case 4 Changed + Pop-up New tabs New tabs Pop-up New tabs 
• Changed: iframeA made change of iframeB's location. 
• Pop-up: iframeA issued a popup box for certain url. 
• New tabs: iframeA issued a new tab for certain url. 
From the result, browsers have different method to handle navigation request issued 
from Flash swf. The two results of grayed cells are out of expectation. 
In case 2, the swf file hosted in different domain is allowed to change iframeB's location. 
However, if the swf file stored under same domain, Firefox will not allow iframeA to 
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change iframeBs content. Primitively, Firefox does not allow navigateToURL to change 
iframe's location when all resources stored under the same domain, it violated the rule 
of origin access when the swf file is stored under different domain. 
In case 4, we constructed a nested iframe in Case 4 where iframeA host under same 
domain and another nested iframe - iframeA' host under different domain. By the 
principle of SOP, iframeA' shouldn't have the ability to change iframeBs content as 
they are under different origin. However IE 8 failed to restrict the access from iframeA', 
iframeB's can be changed by navigatToURL and pop up another windows point to the 
target location. .. 
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4.3 Trusted Notification System 
We propose a Trusted Notification System(TNS) to prevent and alleviate current and 
future web attacks by reflecting user's action and change of status of his account. TNS 
aimed to notify user if they had made critical request to web applications with their own 
session, such as login/logout, money transaction, send a mail, purchase an item and etc. 
With this notification system, user can further approve or deny the request they had 
made within a period of time. 
Under TNS, all known request issued by client browser will be examined. Attacks such 
as common CSRF and phishing attacks can be detected. 
4.3.1 Assumptions 
We assume the both client and server side had installed the notification system TNS. 
Client browser needed to install our chrome extension such that the native notification 
box can popped up if there exist any change of status of his own account. Where 
the server side only need a minor changes of their current system by calling notify() 
function whenever they needed to send a request to the client side. If client accepted 
the notification service, feed will constantly be pulled and displayed on the browser if 
any status changes occurred with his session. 
4.3.2 Implementation Issues 
Distributed vs Centralize service 
We had chosen distributed services for our notification system with following advantages. 
Firstly, we don't need to maintain 24 hours centralize server to store all feeds from 
different web sites and different user. It is CPU time expensive if we build such a 
system. Secondly, privacy between server and client can be maintained as all update 
information will only be review from the legitimate server and client browser without 
involvements of a 3rd party. Thirdly, its prevent a single point of failure if this centralize 
server is down then all feeds will be gone. DDOS attacks on the centralize notification 
system can be prevented. 
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The disadvantages of the distributed notification system included legitimate server may 
over use our notification scheme and sending spams to server without our centralize 
supervision. However user can also choose to ban such advertising sites to use the 
notification services. 
Single vs Multiple notification session 
We prefer a single session for our TNS. Only one client (Browser) of the same account 
can see the notification feed. For example, user Alice had login to his own account using 
two PC, only the first PC can view the notification feed popup instantly. Any changes 
made on the second.PC (login, transaction) can be viewed only from the first PC. If 
Alice wants to use notification system on the second PC, he needs to kick out first PC 
session. A warning box will be shown on the first PC if he is being kicked out from 
other browser. Whereas a multiple notification session will provide both PC view the 
same feed. 
We had go through the possibility of using multiple notification monitoring system and 
found out that it is not desirable in following cases: 
If the hacker sniff a section of Alice's account and maintain it silently without doing 
action, Alice may never notice it. In this case, the hacker will be able to view any 
transaction done by Alice. Since client pulled the feeds constantly, server cannot tell 
which feed is being fetch or hot in multiple session. In order to maintain such multiple 
notifications session, extra record needed to be stored on server side, which violated the . 
simplicity design of TNS. 
The single session can already notify victim, if his account being logined by third party ‘ 
(Hacker). It achieved the main purpose of the scheme - to notify the victim with single -
session. 
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4.3.3 Information flow 
TNS will use the existing session between client and server that no extra login is need 
for notification feature. Once the client side accepted and use the notification system, 
it will pull news feed from server every 10 seconds. Server either reply as "no news" or 
oldest unread feed back to the authenticated client. 
Details implementations are as follow: 
1. Page of document root (index.html) or login page needed to include a link tag in 
its header to tell the extension whether they implemented such notification system. 
Here is a sample link tag: 
<link 
href=‘http://www.bank.com/bank/notification.php?action=fetch, 
history:，http://www. bank, com/bank/not if ication.php "Fact ioii=liistory, 
title='Sample bank' 
rel='notification'〉 
2. A notification database with one table for storing news notification is needed. 6 
attributes are needed on the feeds table, included: type of notification, notification 
messages, read or unread, time, userid and id of feed. 
3. If the extension found such link tag with rel=notification in the index page, it will 
ask whether the user adopt the notification pop-up. User can choose to ignore it, 
adopt it or ban this notification. 
4. Server call notify('type', 'notification message body'); when any changes of status 
of the client is made. A record will be written on server database as unread feed. 
5. Client will keep polling the server every 10 seconds. Once a new feed is being 
polled, it will mark as read on server database. 
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4.3.4 Features 
We choose chrome extension to implement TNS since it have several features that other 
browser do not exist. 
t . ‘ •• •••••• > .,,...... , • . . , ••y •- •• % •. • ；. • ： • ；• -- . ... . 
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Download the notification Chrome Extension here 
FIGURE 4.5: Trusted notification popup 
4.3.4.1 Counter fake 
The popup notification box (Top right corner of figure 4.5) on chrome is a native browser 
feature which can not be fake by today's Javascript technique. Since the box is being 
pop-up and stackable unlike browser windows, it is fundamentally different from a normal 
windows popup. 
Information provided by TNS is also strictly restricted. For example, the legitimate site 
can only provide text with it. No HTML tag and no Javascript will be interpreted. The . 
IP / domain name are obtained from the URL which will be reflected on the popup. In . 
this case, any badguy's notification cannot fake a genuine message of other sites. 
4.3.4.2 Plug and play 
To use our notification system, no registrations are needed on a third-party site. He just 
need to activate the services in the extension for certain website. No records are made 
on any other parties. He can also deactivate such services in any time if he needed. 
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4.3.4.3 Mitigate future attacks 
TNS not tailor made to mitigate current web attacks, although it can. Most kind of 
attacks that make advantages from user session can also be recorded down with our 
notification system. Notification feeds will not be provided on every action made from 
the user, say changing page from transaction to view saving account will not affect the 
client's account status and which won't be included in TNSs feed. However, in other 
social network applications, adding a friend or 'like' a page may be regarded as important 
change of status of current account. Since you may expose your private information to 
others if you are now 'friend' with the badguy. The developer is responsible for adding 
notification only on important changes of accounts status, such that it wont be annoy 
the user with tones of feeds. 
'Paste on URL' attacks exist in facebook, which ask user to paste malicious Javascript 
to browser and claimed that they can do certain benefit. The outcome of such Javascript 
actually makes use of the victim's account to send email to other and spread the attack 
vector itself. Our mitigation can prevent such attack to spread out, since even if ignorant 
user paste malicious Javascript on the URL, he will be notified that he sent email to 
others with our notification system, he can deny if it the developer provide such feature. 
Old attacks such as Click-Jacking, XSS and phishing can also be notified by TNS if they 
affected users account status. 
4.3.4.4 Session persist after logout 
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Download the notification Chrome Extension here • 
F I G U R E 4.6： Persistent notification after logout 
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Time: 2010 08-18 17.59.12 Home page: hnp;//bcnional.ic.ci>hV.alu hl/-.ikjOOI4/1«nkyiodciJ)hp 
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FIGURE 4.7： History view of notifications .. 
The session stored on the client side will not be cleared even if user had logout from the 
system. Figure 4.6 shown a logout notification after the user logout from the system. 
The 'logout' action performed on the server side on discards the view account details and 
transaction feature on the system. The session of TNS still persist for monitoring his 
recent activities (In figure 4.7). The hacker can only granted view account's notification 
feeds history if he physically with TNS session. For the legitimate client, he can be 
notified if he is under login CSRF attack when he being tricked to login with attackers 
session. 
4.3.4.5 Follow the standards 
Our notification did not create another standard but it make use of the current W3C • 
Editor's Draft on 22 June 2010'^ Any site wanted to adopt our notification extension 
is easy, which included adding a link tag with rel attribute as 'notification', and call 
'notify(message)' when they want to notify the user. We believe the schema of our 
Trusted notification system will become a standard in near future, since it is capable to 
provide feedback to the user in a more secure way. 
4.3.5 Related works 
Spoofstick is a toolbar extension for IE and firefox that can tell user what site they are 
currently visit. They have a database for well-known sites such as Ebay, Amazon and 
Google. If user visiting a spoofed site with common name, the toolbar will acknowledge 
'^http: " d e v . w3. org/2006/webapi/WebNotif ications/publish/ 
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the user and help users to detect attacks from a domain name that syntactically or 
semantically similar to legitimate site. 
Yip5 is a notification system work with Growl, it is a Firefox extension that can show 
latest update on web events with growl framework. Unlike our TNS, YIP is not built 
for security purpose and the victim will not be notified if the hacker uses the victim's 
account to login at other places. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we had investigated the cross-domain request behavior on different 
browser. We found out that IE8 provide more restrictive implementation on XDR 
interface, as it restrict the header sent from client cannot be changed, support only 
GET/POST/HEAD method and forbidden cookies being attached on it. On the other 
hand, Firefox follows HTML5 guideline more strictly than Chrome browser. In our 
experiment, it is unexpected that Chrome can approve user to send cross-site POST 
request with cookies attached without requesting cross-site permission from the server. 
In the study of cross frame communication with flash, we found out two unexpected 
behavior. One of the bug is that a Flash swf file hosted in nested iframe can be able 
to change other iframe's location that violated the SOP design and its happen only on 
IE8. Another bug on Firefox is that iframe location change only if the swf file hosted 
on different site. 
We also studied the crossdomain behaviour on FlashlO, and found that over 30% of sites 
which provide crossdomain.xml file will open their access to all public sites and at least 
53 sites open the door for full access from publics which is undesirable from the original 
design of cross domain policy file. 
We proposed our Trusted Notification System - TNS that can prevent recent and future 
web attacks by notifying victim's current status changes. Our Notification system is 
differed from existing mitigations that aimed to mitigate specific attacks by completely 
eliminate them. Whereas our system allows those attacks exist and report them back 
to the user in order to lower the success rate and the damages caused by hacker. 
®http://abcdefu.wordpress. com/2009/06/09/introducing-yip-cin-unified-not if icat ion-system-f or-the-web/ 
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The difficulties of adoption on both client and server side may difficult is the major 
drawbacks of TNS. Moreover, we cannot eliminate the any possibility of future vulnera-
bility pinpointing to our notification system, although current attacks such as XSS, SQL 
injection and most known attack won't be able to launch against our extension. 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The web security issue is an important topic today. In this thesis, we go through 
some latest attacks and defense with the diversity of cross-site request, session handling, 
network security, privacy and more. Although it does not exist an ultimate solution to 
mitigate all kinds of attacks, we propose a trusted notification system TNS to reflect 
what the user had actually done on the web. In our notification scheme, every malicious 
request triggered by hacker or unintentionally triggered by victim will notify back to the 
user, if it involve account changes of status. 
5.1 Contributions 
We found out XSS vulnerability on Horde open source email platform, which is com-
monly deployed in many University included CUHK and HKU. This attack exists on 
login page that may allow attacker to steal username and password from victims. 
A hack in facebook applications - Typing Maniac. We successfully inject fake content 
of this application, which can spam on the victims friend wall. 
We investigated how different browsers handling cross frame communication and cross-
site request (XMLHttpRequest) in Chapter 3 and 4. The cross-site request made with 
native Javascript and FlashlO are compared in chapter 4. We also analyze the top 100000 
sites crossdornain.xml file for FlashlO, and found out that there exist 6 % vulnerable 
sites that with no security restriction on cross-site request by allowing all public sites to 
send request to them with Flash. 
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The trusted notification scheme - TNS is proposed for defenses of future web attacks 
on user's session. We implemented it as a chrome extension on client side and also a 
lightweight mod on server side. Which allow developer to adopt it easily by just calling 
notify0 on any action they regard as noticeable changes of user account's status. 
5.2 Discussions and future work 
There are rooms for discussion on the schema of TNS. For more advanced notification, 
it is possible to intercept all kinds of GET and POST request from the client browser 
and notify if they had made an abnormal request. Say if badguy's web site sent a 
transaction request on cross-site without visiting transaction page, or the legitimate site 
request a transaction action before the user visit the transaction pages. Research works 
in Memento[18] suggest to build a complete graph of legitimate site the check whether 
the request are reasonable. 
On the other hands, whether should we adopt a singleton notification session is open for 
discussion. The majority of current web pages are accessible through multiple sessions. 
For example, Google allows you to login and check email using several computers si-
multaneously. But it is usually not applicable on personal banking web accounts, which 
they normally use a more secure and close-source authentication system that may not 
dispose to integrate with our notification scheme. 
For the future works of this notification system, it can be implemented into an application 
that does not depend on browser. Such that it can still run at the background when the •• 
Chrome browser is closed. There is still a long way to go for building a flawless platform 
on the web. * 
Appendix A 
Non-persistent XSS attack on 
Horde 
We had randomly picked a common open source webmail system' for scripts injections 
and successfully injected scripts on the login page through its URL. We found out 
that the horde frame work had encountered several URL injection problems. We had 
manually found out at least four injections points in this open source web mail system. 
Proof of concepts (Figure A.3) are made for version 4.1.3. 
1. Default test page (Figure A.l ) exist under http: / / v i c t i m . com/horde/imp/test . 
php, we can do a quick search through google with inur l : imp/test . php. We 
found out over 758 distinct results over the world. The test.php exposed important 
server information such as phpinfo() (Figure A.2) call, default configuration files' 
location, server's OS version and etc. 
2. Fake return address: to return to attacker's site after visiting the legitimate web 
page, h t t p : / / v i c t i m . com/l iorde/services/problem.p]ip?return_url=https: / / 
attacker.com/return_to_me.html. 
3. Fake login frame: It will insert a login frame to the user's webmail with its own 
session, such that victim will revisit the fake login iframe and then re-login to at-
tacker's computer again, http : / / v i c t i m . com/index.php?url=http: / / a t t a c k e r . 
com/f ake _ login_f orm.html 
^http://www.horde.org/ 
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Appendix A. Non-persistent XSS attack on Horde ^ 
4. Change the login form's target location: Since if the user typed a wrong password 
to the login pages, the web page will response with a error message "Login fail" 
that reflected from its own URL. By changing and tailor made a special "error 
message" the form's target location can be changed without awareness of user's 
attention. Following codes are made to minimize the different between a legitimate 
page and the malicious one. 
• To wipe out the notification message. 
var tds = document.body.getElementsByTagName('td')； 
for (var. i = 0; i < 80; i++) { 
if (tds[i].className == "notice") { 
tds [i].parentNode.innerHTML =““ 
} 
} 
• Override the submit button and change the submission target to 
attacker.com 
function submit一login一imp4(servername) { 
if (document.imp一login.imapuser.value == "") { 
document•imp_login•imapuser.focus()； 
return -false 
} else if (document. imp_login. pass. value =="••)•[ 
document.imp一login.pass.focus0； 
return false .. 
} else { 
document.imp_login.server.value = servername; • 





• Change all target action to the malicious function 
function submit_login_owa(servernaine) { 
submit 一 login一imp4(serveriiaine) 
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} 
function submit_login_imp3(servername) { 
submit_login_imp4(servernaine) 
> 
• Automatically redirect attacker.com/trap.php back to its original 
site 
<?php 
echo “ <script>history.go(-l)；</script>"; 
?> 
I o O ^ ^ IMP: System Capabilities Test - , ,“ O , 
eg )⑧④ 想 ： ： 趟 
I Q 赚 S y s t e m C a p a b » i t i « T e s t ； j T t ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ M ^ M ^ ^ ^ M 
IMP Version 
• IMP: H3 (4.0.2) 
Other Horde Applications 
• gollem: No ：, 
Gollem provides access t o local VFS ftlesystems to a t t ach files. | 
• ingo: Yes (Version: H3 (1.0.2-RC1)) | 
• nag: Yes (Version: H3 (2.0.1)) [. 
• turba: Yes (Version: H3 (2.0.2)) ( 
PHP Version 
！ 
• View phpinfoO screen |；； 
• View [oadcd extensions i 
• PHP Version: 5.2.10 [ 
• PHP Major Version: 5.2 
• PHP Minor Version: 10 
• PHP Version Classification: release 
• Wow, a myst ica l vers ion of PHP f rom the fo tu rc . L e i dev@Hsts .ho rde .o rq ^ 
know wha t vers ion you have we can fix th is sc r ip t . 
O Find: ！^ ( Next | Previous ) ( C X H i q h l难 t a!i、) • Masch case 
FIGURE A .L : Server side information exposed in default test page 
This attack can be launched on latest browser (Firefox 3.6.4 and Chrome 6.0). While IE 
8 had security feature to block URL injection, which will be discussed in the next section. 
For HTTPS protected sites, an alert box will be pop out if the domain is switching from 
site A to site B under normal security restriction, To minimize the impact and cover the 
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# Q « 二 ？T] phpi'nfoO . CD; 
« Back to test.php Jj 
System Unux malca.relna.st 2.6.9-t.867smp ifl SMP Tue Nov 214:5952 EST 2004 ^ I 
Build Date "Oct 20 2004 1 4:53:02 / ~ “ j 
Configure './configure' '-buildaiSSe-redhaMinux' '"host=i386-fedhat-linux' Marget=j386-redhat-iinux-gnu' 
C o m m a n d ' - p rog ram-p re f i x s * ' - p r e f i x s A i s r ' - -exec-pref ix=/usr ' ' -b !nd i r=A is r /b in ' " -sb ind i rs /usr /sb in" I 
•-sysconfdir=/etc' '~datadtr=:/usr/share' '-includedins/usr/indude' '--libdfts/usr/lifa' r 
’~tibexecclir=AJsr/libex€c"~locatetatedir=/Var*'-sharedstatediiWusr/coni"~manclir=;/usr ！ 
/share/man' '-inlodirs/usr/share/info' '-cache-nies../config.cache' '-with-<JonfighfiJ6-path=/elc' f 
‘ ‘~ ;w i t t vconf fg - f i l6 -scan-d i r= /e tc / j>hp. ( j r~e f jab te* to rce-cgked i rec t "~< l 丨 s ^ t e * d e b u g ' . 
. , -enable-piC '-disabie-rpath' '-enable-inline-optifnization' '-with-bz2' W/ith-db4Misr' ？' 
“ ' . '~wlth-curr '--wlth-exec-difs/usf/bin' '-wFth>-fr6eiype-dir=/usf '--wtth-png-clir=;/usr' '-with- \ . 
, gcJ=shafed' ' - enab le -gd -na t i ve - t t f ' ' -w i i hou t -gc tom ' ' - w i t t v ^ e t l e x t ' ' -w i th- r>cufses=shafec l ' I 
\ . '-with-gmp' '-witMconV '-with-jpeg-dirs/usr' '-with-png' '-with-pspell' 
'-with-xmr '-with-expat-cl(r=/usr' •-wittHJom=shareciyusr"--wUh-doin-xs«=/usr' '-with- ！ 
dom-exs l t= /usr ' ' - w i l h - x m l r p c = s h a r e d ' '-wUh-pae-regexs/usr' ' -w i th -z l f b ' ' - -vn th - layoutsGNU' 1 
'-enable-bcmath' '-enable-exlf '-enable-ftp' '-enable-magic-quotes' '-enable-safe-mode' ； 
'-enable-sockets' '-enabte-sysvsem' '--enable-sysvshm' '--enable-track-vars' '-enable- I 
t rans-s id ' ' - enab l& -yp ' ' - e n a b l e - w d d x ' '-wiih-pear=/usr/share/pear' ' - w i i h - i m a p = s h a r e d ' ^ 
'-with-imap-ssr '-with-kerberos' '-with-lclap=sharecl' '--with-mysql=shared,/usr' '--vvith- I 
pgsqiashared" '-with-snmpsshared/usr' '--with-snmpsshared' '--enable-ucd-snmp-hack' ^ 
‘ . ' - w i t h - u n i x O D B C = s h a r e d ^ u s r ' - -enab le -memory- l im i t ' - enab le -shmopV ' -enab ie -caJenc la r ' l— 
, • n n d : f5 [ " " " " “ ‘ ) ( Next | Previous ) ( o Highlight ail ) 口 Match case 
L魄 Pi/1 幽 碰 她 擁 临 ， ， , . . , . . • ‘ 、 , ^  J 
FIGURE A.2: Server side information exposed in phpinfo 
trail of attack, we can register a valid certificate from trusted CA, then user will post 
their form to us without warnings. 
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FIGURE A.3: Legitimate webpage with URL injection 
隱 纖 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
COMPU; C E N : ; : ; 广琴 ^ ^ ^ 潘 
THr U K ^ ^ I T Y OF no\C KONG , > 〜 j j g T為 J i b ^ j ^ i i l r f ^ I f f l 
^ ^ ^ ！ H o m e ^ Help | FAQ | N e w s \ ICT f o r T c a c h t n q & Learn…g 1 A d v i s o r y G r o u p s | IT 坑fMCflIgg I AnnM^' ftgPPt? 
Set Spgm Filter I Chec< and ftdlust P?sk Quota t Set/Unset Email ronvarc^nq | Set/Unset Vacation Message I fAQ ？n Emaij 
IMP Webmail Usgr Gu^gg 
Computer Centre Webmail . 
Tips for using Webmail: 
Haven't received any new emails lateiy? 
No email in INBOX but still oromptinQ Quota exceeded? 
Cannot recerve some mail? Lode in the soam folders. 
‘ Stop spam bv setting Soam Filters in vour account. 
Username: j victim | 
I ••…• — I Forgot your Password: I -‘..•+...� 
PlN/Pa$swofd?? 
Login Emai! ( HKUCC.HKU.HK ) ( HKUCCKHKU.HK ) 
细 * ( HKUSUA.HKU.HK ) ( HKUSUC.HKU.HK ) 
( GRADUATE.HKU.HK ) 
You are using non-secure mode HTTP protocol. Click here to enter secure mode using HTTPS protocol, 
if you are using PDA or handheld device you can try Mobile WebmaiK 
Note： 
1. If you cannot receivc，view or defctc any e-mail in webmail, click Check and Ad just Disk Quota to increase your disk 
quota temporartly. 
Z. Deleted mail, by default, will be placed in the -Trasli- folder for a retention pcriotl of 2 days. You may change your 
default by clicking the Options icon after login webmail. 
[Bone . . ,,i—.」..邊一一丄 
；e O Mozilia Firefox CD 
[ , _ ..…、.::.:..> - '、. … j 
r C ^ l Q ^ © C K ) ( 5 ) X .L i : http://192.168.74.56/trap.php • • ) •广 G o o g l e " 1 
You had made following requests to my page: 
Fri,25 Jun 10 09:19:14+0000 
host=imp2 .webmail .hkuJik scrver=hkuc€ uscr=victim password=victim 
Click to see the file 
L5fiD®— ~ “ ~ . ~ - - ~ j- ™ - “~ — “ ^ 
FIGURE A.4: Attacker server to receive the password 
Appendix B 
Data tampering attack on 
facebook application 
In our study, we had successfully found a design flaw of facebook and its application (In 
figure B.l) which allow user to inject intended contents to attacker's friend wall. The 
facebook application called Typing Maniac use 2 times "url encoding" to encode user 
submitted data from flash player. We can change the image of application, hyperlink of 
the image and scores of the feed in this application. Such that a click to the image will 
link to attacker's site. 
g d k ^ i A j y j l ^ l l Scott has Just been playing Typing Maniac and scored 999.999. 
^ B j ^ ^ B S ^ H He ranks # 1 among his fr iends 
m ^ ^ K H Typing maniac is a game which measures the typing skills and the 
to think fast that features multtple power ups! 
B l & ^ ^ H SeeMore--.., 
t M June 26. 2009 at 5:07pm via Typing MaWac..：.Comiinent. Like • See if you can beat 
him 
^ victor LI how come you can score 999.999??? 
H v June 25, 2009 at 5:12pm • Delete 
H Scott Tse Because our genes is different. 
June 26, 2009 at 6:03pm • Delete H H m m H 
FIGURE B.l: Facebook application injection flaw 
The tools we used to submit altered contents include firefox's tamper data and online 
m,l encoder which can easily be found and download through the internet. The problem 
of this application is that they faithfully trust user's submitted data and hope attackers 
50 
Appendix B. Data tampering attack on facebook application ^ 
fail to recognize their "2 times URL encode" encryption methodology. By analyzing and 
tamper the communication from client to server, we can easily change the contents of 
such application. 
Mitigations on these kind of attack can be done by redesigning the communication 
method between client and server. Developer just need to limit the responses from 
user within finite choice, and let the server decide a proper responses accordingly. For 
example, user should tell the server how much they scored and let the server distribute 
a corresponding "celebrating images". But not let the user to supply the hardcoded 
image's URL to its own server. 
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